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The European Union has been widely and extensively criticised for its lack of accountability, legitimacy
and democracy.  The European Commission, effectively the executive of the European Union, is no
exception.  Its President and Commissioners are unanimously nominated by the European Council
(the Member States governments) and approved by the European Parliament.  After the ratification of
the Nice Treaty, the Council will vote by a qualified majority and the EP will have to give its assent.
This puts the Commission President in an ambiguous situation of being the head of the European
executive while being elected in an intergovernmental deal behind closed doors.  This procedure can
hardly be described as democratic.  With the increasing competences of the EU and the increasing
demand for democratic reforms, the idea of electing the Commission President has become a very
prominent one.
Simon Hix in his recent article, Linking National Politics to Europe,1 argues that the President of the
European Commission should be elected by the national parliaments of the (current) fifteen EU Member
States.  Simon Hix has provided an excellent paper which makes a range of very important points,
stimulating a much needed debate.  In this paper, I argue against HixÕs idea, suggesting instead that the
European Parliament should elect the President of the European Commission.
Hix proposes that the lower Houses of the Member States should form an ÔElectoral CollegeÕ.  Each of
the lower Houses holds a different number of Electoral College Votes (ECVs).  These ECVs are
equivalent to the number of seats allocated to each state in the European Parliament (Article 190 EC).
Therefore, Germany would have 99 ECVs, the UK 72 and Luxembourg 6.2 The different national
parliaments then vote on the Commission President.  The total number of votes per candidate will be
transferred into ECVs.  So if 30 of the Luxembourg MPs votes on one candidate and the other 30 on
his or her opponent, each would receive 3 ECVs.  Finally, in his article Hix considers alternative
election scenarios for the position of Commission President, such as universal suffrage, through the
European Parliament or through a qualified majority vote in the Council (the Nice agreement), all of
which he rejects.
I will argue that introducing an Electoral College will leave the power to elect the Commission President
ultimately with the national governments and will not have the effect - desired by Hix - of transferring
it to the parliaments.  A look at the actual numbers involved in HixÕs models will show that his scenario
and an election by QMV in the Council are likely to produce the same outcome.Ê4
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This article will first explore HixÕs argument and critically examine HixÕs main arguments.  I focus on
five core points:
(1) the argument that the media will pick up on a Commission President election which
takes place in national parliaments;
(2) the argument that new checks and balances will be introduced since the Commission
President, under HixÕs model, would be more likely to be from a different political tradition
than the majority of the Council;
(3) the argument that the Commission President would be able to call on supporters
from every Member State who would be accountable for their votes;
(4) the claim that the manifestos of the candidates would be picked apart by the press
across Europe; and
(5) the claim that the proposal is the most simple and efficient one.
Secondly, it will argue that HixÕs model will in effect produce the same outcome than the current
(post-Nice) model does.  The power to elect the President is in fact not transferred to the national
parliaments but it stays with the government, and when the fifteen separate governments get together
they effectively make up the Council.  This is exactly the situation we have at the moment.
Thirdly, a brief summary will follow of why the Commission President should not be elected by the
national parliaments of the EU Member States.
Fourthly, the argument is presented that the Commission President should be elected by the European
Parliament.  After a personalised European-wide election campaign with party front-runners as
presidential candidates, the EP would have a mandate to elect the President.  Furthermore, this model
is very likely to increase public interest in and media focus on the European political process in general
and the European Parliament election more specifically.  Finally, a brief conclusion will sum up the
article.Ê5
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Hix claims that electing the president via national parliaments would Ô[É] be covered in
the national media because of their dominant focus on national parliamentary politics.
[É] the debate would be about the actual policy direction of the EU, rather than whether
or not the EU is a good thing.Õ3
These are effectively two arguments and will be dealt with accordingly.  First, the President of the
Commission is only elected/nominated every five years.  A campaign in which candidates have to
come forward with different policy agendas is clearly a good thing and would increase accountability
at the European level.  However, it has to be said that to discuss policy alternatives only every five
years is not a sufficient improvement on the current situation, under which a clear deficit of public
policy debate on the European level is apparent.  There is a potential danger that the debates only
really move to the forefront of media attention at the time of the Commission PresidentÕs election.
The fact that under HixÕs proposal the President would be elected by fifteen different chambers means
that the President would have to spend a lot of his or her time travelling in order to report to his or her
supporters in the different houses.  Not only would this cost a President time, which he or she might
otherwise spend on actually Ôgetting on with the jobÕ; it would also not necessarily stimulate a Europ-
wide media coverage.  It is not likely that La Stampa or France 2 will make a headline story reporting
that the President of the Commission has reported to the Finnish Parliament.  Danish media coverage
might be high when the presidential candidates appear in the Folketinget; yet a European-wide debate
is not likely to spark from this.  National parliaments will elect the President, and hence national issues
will dominate the debate in the different Member States.  Therefore, HixÕs model is not likely to
trigger the highly desired increase in media attention and public debate about policy choices in the
European Union.  In whatever way the Commission President is to be elected, the form of election
should maximise media attention and possibly trigger a European-wide public debate.  This is rather
unlikely with a handful of speeches in the different national parliaments.
Second, Simon Hix argues that competition for the office (never mind the election mode) will produce a
race between a centre-right and a centre-left candidate.  This is highly likely to happen and it is very
desirable at the same time.  Already, national politics are traditionally divided along this cleavage as the
government party and the leading opposition party are typically centre-left and centre-right respectively.
Yet, this inference has a crucial implication: under HixÕs model, the Ôpresidential debateÕ in the national
parliaments will probably be reduced to government and opposition parties supporting the candidate of
their respective political tradition.  MPs would not choose the candidate better suited for the job as
Commission President but simply the one with the same (or at least similar) political tradition.4
Additionally, Hix did not consider the likely possibility that a debate within national parliaments on
European politics will probably be diverted onto national rather than pan-European issues.  National
politicians are elected to deliver national policies not European ones.  It is not difficult to image the
debate in a Member StateÕs lower chamber turning into a traditional government vs.  opposition
confrontation over national issues rather than being a constructive discussion about European policy
choices.  It should not be forgotten that MPsÕ actions/speeches/discussion in the parliamentary area are
always undertaken with (at least) one eye on the next election - or at least the latest opinion polls.  It will
therefore be extremely easy to divert the debate onto national issues, such as the Euro debate in Britain or
the debate on the Snus chewing tobacco - which is exactly what Hix is really trying to avoid.Ê6
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ÔThere would be new checks and balances in the EU [É] the head of the EU executive if
more likely to be from a different political tradition than the Council majority.5
What Hix seems to have in mind is a US style system of checks and balances where Congress (since
the Reagan presidency more often than not) is of a different political colour than the President.  Apart
from France and Finland, there are no presidential systems in Europe.  Therefore, the idea that the
executive and legislative are Ôchecking and balancingÕ each other is not part of the wider European
political heritage.  Even in the case of a French co-habitation checks and balances are traditionally
low.  As seen during the Jospin-Chirac years, the Prime Minister was effectively leading the country
under co-habitation, whereas during times when the President and Prime Minster are of the same
political party, it is traditionally the President who leads the country.  These underlying assumptions
are clearly one of the factors driving the June 2002 French Legislative Election results.  A checks and
balances system similar to the one in the US is not in place.  It is important to bear in mind that Europe
is not familiar with the idea of a system of strong checks and balances between the legislative and
executive.  That is not to say that it is a Ôbad ideaÕ per se, but merely that it does not seem right to
introduce a political system to the European Union which few in Europe are familiar with or can relate
to.  Any reforms made to the EU political and institutional order should try and bring Europe Ôcloser to
its citizensÕ.  European countries have traditionally been governed by parliamentary democracies; the
EU should reflect this.
Hix points to the fact that under the post-Nice procedure, the Commission President will be nominated
by a qualified majority, it seems rather inevitable that the President will be of the same political
tradition than the majority in the Council.  Moreover, Hix assumes that under his proposal, under
which national parliaments are to elect the President, it would be more likely that a majority would be
found which supports a candidate not of the same political colour as the majority of EU Member
StatesÕ governments.  This assumption is based on HixÕs proposed voting procedure which will be
explained later in the essay.
However, Hix points out that European Parliament elections are regarded as secondary elections mostly
resulting a victory of the opposition party in the different Member States.  Therefore, the Council and
EP are likely to represent majorities of opposing political orientation.  This has been especially evident
in the past two European elections.  Therefore, if the European Parliament was to elect the Commission
President, he or she would be of a different political colour than the majority in the Council.  Because
the EP and the Council are likely to be dominated by opposing political party groups (or party families)
there is already an adequate system of checks and balances in place.  And this system is as far as
possible institutionalised through the conciliation committee, which is formed by the Council and the
European Parliament under the co-decision procedure on an ad hoc basis as required.  Why does Hix
think another layer of checks and balances is needed? And how is his model actually adding another
layer? The Council and EP are likely to be of a different political tradition, and consequently the
Commission President (whether elected by national parliaments, the Council, the EP or even by universal
suffrage) would inevitably be of the same political tradition as one of the two - assuming that the two
ÔstrongÕ political traditions of centre-left and centre-right will always predominate.  However, even
the possibility of a Ôthird caseÕ or third party scenario would mean that parties of different political
tradition would hold majorities in the different institutions.
In addition, the cleavage in European politics is not only running between left and right as it does
traditionally in the Member StatesÕ national parliaments.  On the European level, the most apparent
cleavage is between pro- and anti-integrationists or between integration and intergovernmentalism.
Voting behaviour in the European Parliament proves that the claim for classic party politics is almost
absent.  It is often the entire (traditionally more integrationist) House, which unifies (across traditional
party lines) to vote against the (traditionally more intergovernmental) Council.  The EP ÔÉ does notÊ7
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have a permanent majority coalition and [its] party structures are not all-pervasive.Õ6  The current
Convention on the Future of Europe is a classic example.  MEPs are the most cohesive group of actors
in the Convention and they work together across party lines to make the biggest impact possible on the
outcome of the Convention.
The European Union does not currently lack an institutional system of checks and balances, or
Ôinterinstitutional balanceÕ.  The current system, with the Council and European Parliament being
equal legislators under the co-decision procedure, produces a sufficient level of checks and balances.
Moreover, it is crucial that whatever reforms and changes the European Union is going to undertake in
the near future, its citizens should be able to identify with the institutional order of the Union.  Its
citizens will only support it if they understand Ôwhat it is all aboutÕ.
ÔThe Commission President would have supporters in every Member State, who would
then be accountable for their votes for the incumbent President.Õ7
Achieving a situation whereby the Commission President can rely on visible support in the different
Member States is highly desirable.  This would make him or her accountable to those people who have
voted for him or her.  Hix is right to draw attention to this and indeed any future reform of the election
process of the Commission President should improve the issue of accountability within the European
institutional set-up.
Hix favours a model whereby the Commission President would be accountable to a body (or rather 15
different bodies) which is detached from the day-to-day political process of the European Union.
Under HixÕs model, national MPs would vote for the Commission President, but due to their general
detachment from EU politics in between the President elections, there would be no permanent link in
terms of accountability between the two institutional layers.  Nevertheless, a situation whereby the
Commission President is relatively detached from his or her ÔconstituencyÕ could be regarded as a
positive situation.  It would give the President more political freedom and flexibility to act.  Yet, the
Union needs to develop a political system which shows clear lines of direct accountability which can
be traced back to its citizens.
A Commission President elected by an Electoral College consisting of fifteen different national
parliaments would create another accountability gap.  National parliaments are almost certain to change
their political outlook over the five-year term of the Commission President.  A substantial number of
the MPs who elected the President under HixÕs model might have been voted out of office before the
next Commission presidential election.  Additionally, their departure from (or entrance into) office
will be most definitely unrelated to the MPs personal behaviour during the election of the Commission
President nor due to his or her personal work record.  With 15 different national parliaments (and a
potential 27 in an enlarged Union) a substantial change in the composition of these parliaments as a
whole is inevitable.  For example, if Jacques Santer had been elected by national parliaments in 1995
and had he secured the support of the majority of British MPs (then conservative like Santer), he
probably would have lost the support of most British MPs after the 1997 general election and the
arrival of Tony BlairÕs New Labour government.
Hix suggests that accountability would be achieved by the fact that national parliamentarians can
throw out the Commission President after five years in office if his policy choices and leadership-style
were not according to his/her promises.  Yet during the interim period national MPs could themselves
be voted out of office and it is important to bear in mind that their re-election will most definitely not
depend on whatever choice they made at the last Commission presidential elections.  National elections
focus by and large only on domestic issues.8 Therefore, introducing a system, which firstly makes theÊ8
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Commission President draw on support in the different Member States and secondly makes him or her
accountable for his or her policies is highly desirable.  Taking these criteria into account, HixÕs proposal
does not seem to be the ideal solution.  Under his model, the Commission PresidentÕs (what I would
call) Ôperformance pay backÕ is very low.  Overall the linkage between the two institutional layers
would simply be too thin.  The PresidentÕs support can decrease and his or her accountability can
therefore be reduced without any direct relation to his or her performance in office.  This is not a
desirable solution for a future EU that aims to be closer and more accountable to its citizens.
ÔThe manifestos of the candidates would be picked apart by the national press across
Europe.Õ9
A contest between two or possibly three candidates would very likely provoke substantial media
coverage and spread on interest in the elections of the Commission President across the population of
the Member States.  Media coverage of and public interest in electoral campaigns nowadays is mainly
focused on personalised issues.  Elections have become mostly a run-off between the incumbent
government leader and the opposition challenger, rather than a discussion about policy choices and
competing party manifestos.  For example, in the UK the loss of the 2001 general election by the
Conservatives was partly quite rightly blamed on limited public appeal of the party leader, William
Hague.  Similarly, the US presidential elections have seen this development, possibly since the first
presidential candidate TV debate between Richard Nixon and John F.  Kennedy in 1960.  Two candidates
ÔfightingÕ each other on TV, in newspapers and on the radio are very appealing to the public.  Indeed,
it would bring the election much more into the public limelight than a debate dominated by party
manifestos - and especially on the European level - detailed policy choices.
A personalised election would therefore be a great opportunity to stimulate public interest in the Union
and to trigger a higher voter turnout.  People are more likely to go out and vote for or against a certain
candidate (see the recent second round French presidential elections) then they are to go out and vote
for or against an additional 1p income tax.  A personalised election campaign would be a great
opportunity for the Union to gain the public interest and support it needs to achieve in order to be
recognised as a legitimate political institution.
HixÕs model provides, to a certain extent, this ÔpersonalisedÕ campaign.  However, he limits it to a
debate in the national parliaments, making it merely Ôone debate among othersÕ.  If the respective
chamber were discussing a different, domestically important, issue during the same day, the press
might decide to give the domestic issue prime attention over the discussion about the future Commission
President.  This is not at all unlikely given that government normally sets the agenda.  If the government
decides not to give the debate on the Commission President a prominent place on the agenda, prime
media coverage is not guaranteed.  Also, in a system like the UK with strong party whips and huge
government majorities, it will almost certainly be reduced to a simple exchange of well-orchestrated
government and opposition statements.  It is therefore highly likely that a partisan-dominated debate
on the future President of the European Commission will take place rather than a free debate where
MPs can depart from the official party line.
It has been argued above, that the election process should resemble the general ÔEuropean traditionÕ.
The same should be true for the election campaign.  Despite the focus given to party leaders during an
election campaign, the campaign is still managed and run by their respective political parties.  In
Europe, it is political parties with their large financial and organisational capacity that organise and
run national election campaigns.  This is true in Europe much more so than for example in the US,
where campaigns are run by individuals relying on their own funding and their own election team.Ê9
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Personalising the election campaign does not mean moving completely away form programmatic
politics.  Political parties and their involvement in elections and government building are deeply rooted
in the European political tradition.  It would not be in line with this tradition to have national parliaments
electing the Commission President, but it would be to give this role to the European Parliament.
People should be interested in and stimulated by European politics and European elections.  Having a
debate in national assemblies about a future European Commission President - who will not be
institutionally linked with that national assembly - will not achieve that.  Even if the parliamentary
debate (with one or two presidential candidates attending the session) receives high media attention
this attention is likely to decrease immensely over the next couple of days.  It would be highly
concentrated on one or two days in that particular Member State.  A sustained campaign throughout
the Union between two or three candidates is needed.  Within any Member State and hence also at the
European level, it is difficult to see how that can be achieved without the help of the capable campaign
machinery of political parties.  Due to the European political tradition it seems crucial to achieve a
personalised election campaign, which is managed and organised by political parties.
ÔOf all the proposals to involve national parliaments in the EU - such as allowing national
parliaments to scrutinise EU legislation or creating a Ôsecond chamberÕ of national MPs in
the EU - this is the simplest and most efficient.Õ10
One of the major problems of the Europe political and institutional order is that it is too complicated.
Voting procedures are generally a matter of advanced mathematics, and ordinary legislative procedures
are more complicated than constitutional amendments in most liberal democracies.  Qualified majority,
conciliation committees, unanimity, consensus, vote allocations in the council, majority of states and
majority of people: all these different factors and expressions mean nothing to most European citizens.
The EU should not try simply to make the political process and institutional order more democratic
and more accountable but should also attempt to make it simpler.  How can people support or even
properly criticise a political system (like the EU) without even understanding how exactly it procedures
work?
HixÕs proposal is not one which will help make the European decision-making process less complicated.
On the contrary, it will possibly increase the lack of interest in the European political process because
it would add another institutional layer and another procedure, which is anything but easy for the ÔEU
lay personÕ to understand.  HixÕs model involves an Electoral College spread over 15 countries and
includes (in an EU-15) 4839 people, who would have altogether 626 Electoral College Votes (ECVs).
However, that does not mean every MP has 0.1293 ECVs.  The number varies considerably depending
on how many European Parliament seats the respective MPÕs country holds and how many parliamentary
seats his or her national chamber has.  Therefore, under Hix proposal, a Swedish MPÕs vote would
have 0.05 ECVs,11 whereas a Dutch MPÕs vote would be the equivalent of 0.17 ECV which is more
than three times as many.
Hix is right when he demands that the voting procedure of the Commission President should include
weighed votes; and the allocation of European Parliament seats springs to mind indeed.  The votes of
smaller states have to make an impact despite the vast majority of EU citizens living in only five
Member States.  But the system Hix suggests looks very complicated indeed because different countries
have different numbers of MPs.  Therefore, Hix model would bring the EU to a situation where single
MPs in some Member States have a much smaller ECV than MPs in other countries, as the numbers
above have shown.Ê10
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HixÕs claim that his model is the Ômost efficientÕ might not hold if practicality and transparency are
taken into account.  The Treaty of Nice has been widely criticised for the confusing voting reforms of
the Council it will institute if ratified.  The system Hix proposes seems to be equally complicated and
it is questionable whether European citizens would be interested in an election process from which
they are excluded and where the functioning is complicated and difficult to understand.  Again the
argument has to be made that it would be a method of election (through an Electoral College), which
is alien to the political culture of the EU Member States.  In fact, it would be as if the Lnder parliaments
in Germany were to elect the federal Chancellor.  And we should be reminded that in the US
ÔrepresentativesÕ of the States make up the Electoral College, not members from the State parliaments.
The Electoral College Men in the US have been elected especially to elect the President, for members
of State parliaments have no mandate to do so.  These Electoral College Men have a clear and straight
forward mandate: to elect the US President, whereas MPs in the EU Member StatesÕ parliaments have
not at all been elected with that kind of mandate.  This goes back to the accountability and legitimacy
gap referred to earlier on in this essay.  Nevertheless, it can be argued that HixÕs proposal is an efficient
way to include national parliaments in the process.  I am convinced that the reform process should
foremost be about a proposal, which offers an efficient way to elect the Commission President.  It has
been argued that national parliaments should be more closely involved in European politics and HixÕs
proposal seems to deal with this issue more than with the question of how best to elect the Commission
President.
One of the biggest problems the EU is facing today is its lack of transparency.  Giving national
parliaments a say in the European political process might increase transparency but reformers must
ensure that this is done in a way which increases efficiency and legitimacy of the entire European
political process.  Any Commission President election should be straight forward, comprehensible
and logical to every citizen.  This would also add to HixÕs idea of the President becoming a household
name,12 and it would increase the EUÕs profile and bring Europe closer to its citizens.
Therefore, HixÕs model defeats the real object of any proposed reform of the EU along these lines,
namely to make the EU more efficient and more accountable, and to make EuropeÕs political process
and institutional order easily understandable for its citizens.Ê11
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Examining the figures presented in the annexed table, one can argue that electing the Commission
President via an Electoral College, consisting of national MPs, is very likely to produce the same
outcome as a qualified majority vote in the Council - the procedure agreed on in the Nice Treaty.  In
other words, HixÕs model is likely to result in exactly the same person becoming Commission President
under the system, which he seeks to reform.  Hence, HixÕs model leaves the ultimate power to elect the
president with the national governments, and therefore in effect - so far as they act together - with the
European Council.
A qualified majority vote in the Council would need (after the ratification of the Nice Treaty) 169
votes plus an absolute majority of Member States and a 62% majority of the total of the EUÕs population.
The Council itself is made up of national governments which themselves hold the majority in their
respective national parliaments.  Party blocks voting as a whole largely dominate voting procedures in
national parliaments.  Prior to the actual vote being taken in parliament, all party members agree
which decision they, as a group, will support.  This is often reflected in the votes cast splitting the
parliaments, with the party in power supporting a decision and the opposition opposing it.  The point
is that MPs as a party (rather than as individuals) will either support or oppose it.
HixÕs model suggests the likelihood of a run-off between a centre-left and a centre-right candidate for
the position as Commission President.  Therefore, MPs of a governing party (and its possible junior
partner(s)) of any given Member State will support the candidate which is closest to its political
tradition.  The opposition might be spread across the political spectrum, with extreme left, liberal and
extreme right parties.  Yet it is very likely that they will abstain or vote for the candidate which is
opposing the governmentÕs favourite.  This voting pattern can be seen in the vast majority of votes
taken in national parliaments.  Any bill the government proposes will be rejected by all opposition
parties, even if they act for different reasons.  ÔOppositionÕ frequently trumps ideology in such
circumstances.  So, there is no reason why this ÔtraditionÕ will not be kept in the case of a parliamentary
vote on the Commission President.
If we now assume that a government holds about 55% of the seats in the national parliament we can
calculate fairly easily whether a centre-left or a centre-right candidate is going to win HixÕs Electoral
College vote.  Let us assume that 55% of every Member StateÕs parliament will vote for the candidate
politically close to the government party and the other 45% (i.e.  all opposition votes) will be voting
against the government (i.e.  for the opposing candidate).
It is fairly simple to determine whether the centre-left or the centre-right candidate is going to make it
to Brussels.  With the current situation (after the Dutch and French elections), there is a majority of
centre-right governments in the European Union.  If we take the Council votes allocated in the Nice
treaty, centre-right government would have 150 votes and centre-left governments 87 - the qualified
majority threshold being 169 votes.  Therefore, under the (yet-to-be-ratified) Nice-procedure it is very
likely that the Council will appoint a centre-right candidate.
Under HixÕs model, it would not be the Council which elects the Commission President but the fifteen
different national parliaments, each with the number of Electoral College Votes (ECVs) equal to their
countryÕs seats in the European Parliament.  However, the ECVs can be split between different candidates
depending on whether different MPs vote for different candidates.  Each candidate receives the same
percentage of that countryÕs ECVs as he or she gained in the parliament.  It is not a Ôwinner takes it allÕ
system.Ê12
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If one assumes, as we have done above, that the government and therefore the government MPs13 (in
any Member State) will support the candidate politically closest to it, with the opposition14 supporting
the other candidate, the following result can be expected under HixÕs ECVs model.  The centre-right
candidate will receive the support of all centre-right governments and the votes of those MPs opposing
a centre-left government and vice versa.  The centre-left presidential candidate will receive the support
of the centre-left government MPs and the ones opposing a centre-right government.  Considering the
current outlook of national parliaments in the EUÕs Member States, the centre-left candidate will
receive 262.5 ECVs and the centre-right candidate will win the contest with 272.5 ECVs.
Therefore, under the current (post-Nice) procedure, ten Member States representing 56% of the EUÕs
population and 150 Council votes will favour a centre-right candidate.  It does not seem much of a
prediction to say that a centre-right candidate would win the race.  HixÕs proposal, which involves his
Electoral College Votes, will produce the exact same outcome.
The importance behind this is that the power of electing the Commission President, in both cases, lies
effectively with the national governments of Member States.  In addition, under HixÕs model it would
be very likely that national governments will strike a deal in the Council about which candidate the
government would like to see elected.  As the governments hold the parliamentary majority in their
respective countries, the vote (and indeed the entire parliamentary debate) in the chambers would be
without any impact on the actual outcome, and would become symbolic gesture politics.
It is hard to believe that national governments will not try to influence parliament on such an important
vote - indeed they will make sure that their party colleagues turn up and support ÔtheirÕ candidate;
especially in parliamentary systems such as the UK.  The Council members in their position as
government leaders, will decide in their inner circle which candidate to support, and the government
(i.e.  majority) party whips in the national chambers will make sure that their candidate will receive
the formal approval of the parliamentarians.  HixÕs proposal is therefore one which leaves de facto the
ultimate power with the national governments.  The current election method and HixÕs Electoral College
model are likely to produce the same outcome.  HixÕs model is thus not Ôbringing the national parliaments
into the debateÕ but Ôkeeping the national governments in itÕ.
For a complete overview of the figures and calculations in this section, please refer to the
Appendix.Ê13
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The  The  The  The  The Argument so far Argument so far Argument so far Argument so far Argument so far - an overview  - an overview  - an overview  - an overview  - an overview
¥ National Parliaments have no mandate to elect the Commission President.  The two
institutional layers - Commission President and national parliament - are not linked.
National Parliamentarians would give their votes once every five years and would otherwise
not be much involved in EU activities.  A debate every five years over EU policy choices
is not sufficient.  It does not sufficiently involve national parliaments and it certainly is not
sufficient on its own to make the position of the Commission President a more legitimate
and accountable one.
¥ During the term of a Commission President, national elections will take place and the
outlook of national parliaments is likely to change considerably.  The President is very
likely to face a politically different Electoral College after his or her five years in office.
He or she might lose his or her position due to the simple fact that different MPs (with a
different political tradition and/or generally a different view on Europe) will cast their
votes and not because the President has failed to fulfil his or her election promises.
Therefore, a wide accountability gap is likely to occur.
¥ Personalised election campaigns are likely to stimulate greater public interest than mere
programmatic discussions about detailed policy alternatives.  It is therefore generally a
good idea to have a contest for the post of Commission Presidency because this will
personalise the debate much more than is normally the case in EU politics.  Nevertheless,
if the debate takes place primarily in national parliaments MPs are likely to be told by their
respective parties which position to take and which candidate to support.  The debate
would therefore be reduced to an ordinary discussion between government and opposition
with a predictable vote at the end.
¥ Any reform which the Union undertakes should bear in mind that the EU needs to be
closer to its citizens.  The decision-making process is too complicated and the institutional
order is inherently ambiguous and incomparable to any national counter-part.  HixÕs proposal
is likely to decrease rather than increase the interest of the general public in European
affairs.  It is adding another institutional layer and another complicated voting procedure.
Most Member States (apart from Finland and France) enjoy a parliamentary democracy
with the head of government being elected by parliament (which has a clear mandate to do
so).  HixÕs Electoral College model is alien to the European political culture and therefore
unlikely to find huge support in the European public.  Yet another institutional procedure
is surely not what the European public is looking for.
¥ Electing the Commission President by a qualified majority in the Council (as the Nice
treaty foresees) is very likely to produce the same outcome (i.e.  the same candidate
becoming Commission President) as HixÕs Electoral College model.  This implies that in
HixÕs model the effective power to elect the President will still vest with the national
governments of Member States.  In this light, HixÕs idea to involve national parliaments in
the European political process does not prove very successful.  It rather seems that it is the
national governments calling the shots in the Commission PresidentÕs election.Ê14
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The European Parliament should elect the new Commission President every five years following its
own election by the EU citizens.  Making the EP elect the Commission President is the best option to
achieve an accountable and legitimate political position for the future head of the European executive.
This proposal is certainly less provocative and innovative than HixÕ model, yet it is the most effective
one.  During the EP election campaign each of the European party federations nominates a candidate,
which would become Commission President if his or her party obtained the majority in the European
Parliament elections.  This would bring a face into the EP election campaign.  It would personalise the
campaign and make it much more of a media focus point than it has been so far.
Hix claims that no one is interested in European elections and no one takes part in it, and as a result the
EP has no mandate to elect the Commission President.  Therefore, his approach assumes a stable
preference on the part of European citizens with regard to European Parliament elections.  In other
words, because no one is much interested in them at the moment, this fixes their legitimacy quota and
hence precludes any further development of what European elections might stand for, including investing
them with the importance of effectively giving citizens the chance to choose the Commission president.
However, I believe that the preference of the European citizens is not stable and that a change in the
stake of the EP elections is likely to lead to a considerable increase in citizensÕ interest and participation.
Having different presidential candidates backed by their respective party groups would be the best
(and possibly only) way to stimulate media interest, public debate and voter turnout.  It would allow
for a European wide election campaign.  The candidate would need the majority of votes in most of the
Member States.  So far, national parties have run the EP campaigns in their respective countries - and
the EP campaigns have thus been dominated by domestic rather than European policy issues.  This
situation could be completely transformed.  It would open up the EP elections and make them much
more of a political focal point throughout the Union.  It would give European elections a face (even
several) and allow the elections to be run in a Ôtraditionally EuropeanÕ way; with political parties
running campaigns tailored to a front-runner who is biding for the position as head of government.
The acts of parliamentary elections and appointing (electing) a head of state are traditionally closely
related in European politics.  Applying this to EU politics and therefore giving the EP the power to
elect the Commission President would be in line with this tradition.  It would install a political procedure,
which the European citizens can easily understand and hence produce a Commission President people
can much more easily identify with.
It is important to bear in mind that with the European Parliament electing the Commission President
smaller states do have an influence disproportionate to their population size.  It is crucial that the
President is only a legitimate head of the EU executive if he or she is supported by a vote representing
a large number of citizens from a broad range of Member States.  If there was direct election by
universal suffrage, the votes coming from Luxembourg, Denmark or Ireland would be almost without
any impact at all on the actual outcome.  Electing the Commission President through the European
Parliament, however, means that MEPs from all Member States have an equal vote and as a result of
weighted seat allocations, smaller states and their MEPs would not be disadvantaged in the process.
Furthermore, it will be up to the public and the European party federations to judge the performance of
the Commission President and to decide whether they want to continue to support him or her on his or
her performance in office.  In case the Commission President does his or her job well and delivers his
or her election promises a re-election should be a logical consequence.  In the case of the Electoral
College systems, however, the outlook of national parliaments (and governments) might change andÊ15
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the incumbent might not simply be re-elected.  Therefore, the President might lose his or her job not
because of bad performance but because he or she has not got the ÔrightÕ political tradition any more,
due to a changing majority in national parliaments during the five years office term of the Commission
President.
Giving the European Parliament the power to elect the Commission President would be a logical step
upwards on the Ôladder of steadily-increased powersÕ which the EP has been climbing since the 1987
Single European Act.  Under the current procedure, the Commission President is officially approved
by the European Parliament.  Crediting the Parliament with the formal power of electing the President
would increase the political importance of the Parliament.  In addition, a permanent and strong link
would be installed between the Commission president and the EP which elected him or her.
This is a crucial point, which Hix seems to leave out in his model.  An elected Commission President
would considerably increase his or her political powers and the institutional prestige of his office.  His
or her role in European politics is bound to become much more influential than it is at present.  This
increase in power needs to be countered with a control mechanism.  It would be a political imperative
that the body electing the Commission Presidents assumes this role.  However, it seems rather impractical
for the national parliaments to undertake this function.  The President would need to travel to all
fifteen (potentially 27) national parliaments to be answerable for his or her actions.  Additionally, who
would be able to possibly impeach a governing President? How would 15 different parliaments meet
and discuss this kind of issue? Scrutiny would be very difficult if not impossible to perform under
HixÕs model of an Electoral College.
The European Parliament, however, is in a prime position to carry out its potential task as the scrutinising
body.  The EP is by definition highly involved and up to date when it comes to current European
affairs.  As simple as that may sound, national parliaments are not in that position.  The European
Parliament is the only body able to effectively scrutinise an elected Commission President.  The two
institutions, Commission and European Parliament, are closely interrelated and scrutiny as well as co-
operation has been a continuous feature between them.  The EP would provide an ideal arena for the
Commission President to announce his or her policy plans and to report on the CommissionÕs activities.
Contrary to the Electoral College model, this could take place continuously throughout a PresidentÕs
term on a regular basis; not only every five years in fifteen different Chambers.  Indeed, a system
similar to the UKÕs Prime MinisterÕs Question Time would be an excellent opportunity for MEPs to
check regularly on the PresidentÕs activities and to provide a regular event which will potentially
attract the interest of the public and media.
Hix argues that the EP has no mandate to elect the President as turn-out for European elections is low
and voters use them increasingly to Ôpunish or reward national governmentsÕ.15 Also, he claims that
European elections are (even with the EP electing the Commission President) less significant than
national elections and thus attract less attention by the public, the media and political parties.  According
to Hix, it is therefore unlikely that the Commission presidential candidates would become Ômain talking
point [É] in every Member StateÕ.16 Hix makes two viable points and it is important to address them.
One should not underestimate the effect a personalised election campaign can have.  European election
turnouts have been incredibly low despite the increase in EP competences, as Hix rightly points out.
However, this might be due to the fact that European citizens do not know who and what they are
voting for.  They are not aware of the duties, the rights and the powers of the European Parliament and
they certainly do not know the actual candidates they are voting for.  There is no front-runner for the
Labour Party in the UK for the EP elections never mind a European wide front-runner.  There is
simply no single face people can associate EP elections with and the media can focus its attention on.
A prime example are German Lnder elections.  Lnder competences are, though significant, clearly
less important than the ones of the federal government.  In Germany they are clearly considered asÊ16
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second rank elections.  Nevertheless, media attention, voter turnouts and public interest in these elections
are relatively high.  Lnder election campaigns are often tied to personality.  A so-called Landesvater
or Landesmutter is elected.  A personified election campaign is making up for the lack of political
importance of Lnder elections and thus leads to a considerable interest and turnout.  Having a well-
known face in an election is a large bonus and is likely to increase media attention and public interest.
Having the Commission President elected by the European Parliament would do exactly that and is
therefore provides a great opportunity to boost public interest and debate about European policy issues.
Moreover, it is also the only way to reinforce at last the structure of the European party federations.
The election campaign of the presidential candidate will be managed and run by the European party
federations.  As argued before, election campaigns in Europe are traditionally focused on a candidate
for an executive office, but they are run, managed and organised by political parties, providing
programmatic input and infrastructure capacity.  The European-wide party federations would be able
to provide this17 and take over the job so far provided by national parties, campaigning only on a
national (as opposed to European) platform.  The party federations and their presidential candidates
will need to produce election memoranda offering their policy suggestions and promises.  The public
and the press will have programmes and policies to compare and a debate can develop which will not
stop at Member StatesÕ borders but is potentially transported throughout the Union.  For every citizen
will ultimately vote for the same party supporting the same presidential candidate.  Today people feel
they cannot influence what is happening in Brussels.  A European election which gives the EP a
mandate to elect the Commission President transfers more accountability to EU institutional order and
also more power back to the European citizens.  HixÕs model fails to do that and leaves the power
ultimately with the national governments.
Hix argues that having the EP elect the President is a bad idea because it would lead to a weakening of
the EPÕs legislative powers.  Yet the Commission President is not likely to turn the Commission into a
machine which churns out nothing but legislative proposals.  Neither the Commission President nor
his Commissioners will be members of the European Parliament.  They will have no vote there and
will not be able to influence voting behaviour the way it is possible in Whitehall.  Therefore, HixÕs
scenario of the EP turning into a Ôtalking shop [É] rubber-stamping legislationÕ is not viable.  The
institutional order of the European Union would prevent this scenario.  It has to be emphasised that
despite the increase in its powers, the European Parliament has had a stable relationship with the
Commission; their Ôbalance of powerÕ has not been altered.  The fact that the EP effectively has to give
its assent under the current system to the nomination of the Commission President and all the
Commissioners, has no impact on their political and institutional relationship.  The institutional order
in the EU allows the two agencies to be linked yet to continue to perform their tasks as foreseen by the
Treaties.
Additionally, one must not forget that the European Council remains no less a legislator than the
European Parliament.  The Council is very likely to counterbalance legislative ambitions on the part of
any activist Commission President.  In respect of all legislation falling under the co-decision procedure,
the Council and the European Parliament both have to give their approval.  Therefore, even with an
EP-elected Commission President (and an institutional rapprochement) the Council would still hold
the power to block their combined legislative and executive powers.  In what ever way the Commission
President is going to be elected, the legislative checks and balances produced by the co-decision
procedure will not be altered.
Finally, HixÕs model would alter the institutional order in important ways and is inimical to many
aspects of the idea of Ômulti-levelÕ governance.  National parliaments have no mandate to elect the
Commission President.  They are elected to fulfil their constitutional powers, which are connected toÊ17
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the national political process.  What Europe needs is a political system which acts effectively at the
regional, national and supranational level.  The concept of subsidiarity (which is often undersold)
promotes that decisions should be taken at the most effective level possible.  That would include every
level of decision making commands over its own, legitimate, accountable and capable decision-making
bodies.
Decisions that are best taken at the European level should be taken by European institutions, acting in
accordance with the principles of legitimacy, accountability and democracy.  Reforms should aim at
improving the legitimacy, accountability and democracy of the European institutions; which they are
no doubt in need of.  National parliaments have no legitimate mandate to elect the Commission President.
They have not been elected to carry out this role.  HixÕs proposal would thus indirectly increase the
lack of legitimacy within the European political process.
Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion ConclusionÊ18
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HixÕs model of an Electoral College consisting of the national parliaments of Member States would
add another institutional layer to the already complicated institutional order of the EU.  It would
alienate citizens even further from the European political process rather than involving them more in
it.  The idea of having an Electoral College electing the head of the executive is unheard of in the
political tradition of the EU Member States.  It would thus be highly questionable whether citizens
would feel that Europe is more democratic, accountable and legitimate if the head of its government is
elected in a way they cannot relate to and they may possibly fail to understand.
Having the European Parliament elect the Commission President would be highly beneficial to the
European political process.  It would make the President accountable to a political body which is
directly involved in European politics and which has the expertise to do so.  It would mean that
European citizens elect a European Parliament which is then responsible for electing the head of the
executive.  This is in line with the long political tradition of parliamentary democracy in Europe.  It is
a system which works and which people understand.  It would bring a face to the EP election campaign
and stimulate public debate and media interest.  It would also allow European parties to develop
further and use their institutional capacity and infrastructure to fight a European wide campaign on
European policy issues, an element which has hitherto been missing in European elections.  The EU
needs a political system which is efficient whilst being accountable, legitimate and democratic.  Having
the Commission President elected by the European Parliament is a first, yet crucial, step to achieve
exactly this.Ê19
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Notes Notes Notes Notes Notes
1 Simon Hix, Linking National Politics to Europe, Network Europe Policy Brief, http://network-europe.net/
political-competition/test/
2 These figures are based on the EP seat allocations in a post Nice scenario.
3 Hix p.31
4 The nomination of national parliamentary representatives for the Convention on the Future of Europe is a very
recent example for this.  The SPD holds currently the majority of seats in the Bundestag.  So instead of sending
the very experienced and well-known CDU MP Wolfgang Schuble who has also an excellent record on European
politics, SPD MPs insisted on sending a rather unknown and low-profile SPD MP, Jrgen Meyer.
5 Hix p.31
6 Corbett, Jacobs, Shackleton The European Parliament, John Harper Publishers, London, 2000, p.213.
7 Hix p.31
8 This is a point which the Tories painfully realised after their 2001 general election defeat, which came after a
campaign focused on the Euro rather than public services.
9 Hix p.31
10 Hix p.32
11 All the figures used are post-enlargement figures based on the numbers agreed on in the not yet ratified Nice
treaty.
12 Hix p.31
13 Holding 55% of the seats in the parliament.
14 Holding 45% of the seats in the parliament.
15 Hix, p.17
16 Hix p.17
17 In this context, an important condition is that the European party statue and financing regulations are properly
put in place per Article 191 - currently vetoed by Austria.Ê20
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